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As the threat of international terrorism rises, there is an increasing requirement to provide evidence-based
information and training for the emergency personnel who will respond to terrorist incidents. Current major
incident training advises that emergency responders prioritize their own personal safety above that of the ‘scene
and survivors’. However, there is limited information available on the nature of these threats and how they may be
accurately evaluated. This study reviews the published medical literature to identify the hazards experienced by
emergency responders who have attended previous terrorist incidents. A PubMed literature search identified 10,894
articles on the subject of ‘terrorism’, and there was a dramatic increase in publications after the 9/11 attacks in 2001.
There is heterogeneity in the focus and quality of this literature, and 307 articles addressing the subject of scene
safety were assessed for information regarding the threats encountered at terrorist incidents. These articles
demonstrate that emergency responders have been exposed to both direct terrorist threats and environmental
scene hazards, including airborne particles, structural collapse, fire, and psychological stress. The emphasis of
training and preparedness for terrorist incidents has been primarily on the direct threats, but the published literature
suggests that the dominant causes of mortality and morbidity in responders after such incidents are the indirect
environmental hazards. If the medical response to terrorist incidents is to be based on evidence rather than
anecdote, analysis of the current literature should be incorporated into major incident training, and consistent
collection of key data from future incidents is required.Introduction
Terrorist attacks have the aim of causing disruption and
widespread fear [1]. In recent years, such attacks have in-
creasingly been designed to cause maximal casualties, and
sometimes emergency responders may be targeted [2-4].
Early in the emergency response to a terrorist attack, the
exact intent, scale, and hazards of an incident may be un-
clear [5,6]. Emergency medical service (EMS) responders
have occupational fatality rates that are comparable to
those of other emergency services [7] and, despite major
incident training that advocates prioritization of personal
safety above that of the ‘scene and survivors’ [8], continue
to die at terrorist incidents [9,10].
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for 12 months following its publication. After th
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(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zerothe risks to personal safety on arrival at a terrorist
incident [11]. A rapidly expanding medical literature ad-
dresses the increasing burden of international terrorist
incidents [12-14] (Figure 1), but articles that do directly
address scene hazards are mostly anecdotal or based on
expert opinion [15,16], extrapolate a generic approach to
safety from single incidents [17], or focus on single
threat types that may not be apparent to the responder on
arrival at an incident [18]. Few attempts have been made
to integrate information from the numerous incidents that
occur each year [19,20].
This narrative review was conducted to identify hazards
to EMS providers involved in the immediate management
of terrorist incidents described in the medical literature.
The review has the objective of using the risks or harm
identified to inform emergency medical responders of
likely sources of threat and allow them to mitigate risks to
safety at future terrorist incidents.tral Ltd. The licensee has exclusive rights to distribute this article, in any medium,
is time, the article is available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
y/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Figure 1 PubMed publications on the subject of terrorism from 1995 through 2013.
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Search strategy
The controlled vocabulary of Medical Subject Headings
(MeSH) does not include specific terms relevant for this
topic. Accordingly, we searched the electronically indexed
database PubMed by using the non-indexed ‘All Field’
terms of ‘scene AND safety AND terrorism’, ‘prehospital
AND terrorism’, and ‘emergency AND responder AND
terrorism’. Furthermore, we applied an ‘All Field’ search of
PubMed by using the term ‘terrorism’ to avoid exclusion
of relevant articles (Figure 2). The search was last un-
dertaken on 4 February 2014. Literature was limited to
English language publications. The reference lists of pub-
lications found on the search criteria were scanned to
identify additional relevant literature. Additionally, the
reports of KAMEDO (Swedish disaster medicine study
organization) were included where reporting specificallyFigure 2 Flow diagram of literature search and retrieved results. KAMon terrorist incidents. The search was conducted inde-
pendently by two authors (JT and MR).
Selection criteria
Scoping searches revealed that few articles primarily ad-
dressed the subject of scene safety at terrorist incidents,
but relevant information was included in many other
articles that described the response to terrorist incidents.
Therefore, no single article type was specified as an in-
clusion criterion, and important information was identi-
fied in study designs ranging from multi-incident studies
of scene hazards through detailed single incident reports
to opinion articles (Figure 2).
Data extraction and quality appraisal
All relevant full-text articles were retrieved and assessed
for the identification of risks or injury to emergencyEDO, Swedish disaster medicine study organization.
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identified were categorized into direct terrorist threats
aimed at EMS providers and, secondly, the environmental
hazards of working at an unstable scene. Data on the
nature of the threat and risk to emergency responders
were extracted. We evaluated manuscript category of the
included articles, and no further assessment of methodo-
logical quality was made.
Results
The results of the literature search are illustrated in
Figure 2.
Threats directed at emergency responders
Secondary explosive devices
Secondary explosive devices are bombs that are placed to
cause casualties among emergency personnel responding
to incidents. A delay in detonation following a primary
explosion or other event is designed to draw in and then
target emergency personnel in large numbers and ma-
ximize injury and damage to the emergency infrastructure
[21,22]. Terrorist use of explosive devices has increased
significantly in recent years, with an estimated fourfold in-
crease worldwide from 1999 to 2006 and with an eightfold
increase in related injuries [14]. Even in a country with a
low risk of terrorist incidents, such as the US, 36,110
bombing incidents occurred between January 1983 and
December 2002, resulting in 5,931 injured and 699 deaths,
and the majority of injuries and deaths were caused by
primary explosive devices with homicidal intent targeting
residential or commercial locations [23]. This analysis of
Bureau of Tobacco, Alcohol, Firearms, and Explosives
data did not identify whether these victims were emer-
gency medical responders but did note an increasing
terrorist tendency to attempt to psychologically intimi-
date a country’s civilian population rather than target
government resources.
The threat of secondary explosive devices creates great
concern among emergency responders [5,22], and emer-
gency responders have been exposed to numerous inci-
dents of improvised explosive device in non-terrorist
situations [24]. However, despite the increasing worldwide
prevalence of primary explosive devices [14], remarkably
few accounts in the medical literature pertain to second-
ary devices designed to target civilian emergency respon-
ders at terrorist incidents [23,25]. Secondary devices may
be more frequent in asymmetrical military conflicts in
which a military emergency response may be perceived by
the terrorist as a legitimate military target [26-28]; how-
ever, incidents of this type are not routinely reported in
the medical literature.
Perhaps of comfort to the civilian emergency responder
is that of the 36,110 bombing incidents identified in the
US between 1983 and 2002 [23], only four or five involvedsecondary devices; of this limited number, two were un-
dertaken by the same individual: in 1997, Atlanta Olympic
Park bomber Eric Rudolph planted several devices, includ-
ing a device that detonated 1 hour after a primary device,
injuring four public safety personnel with shrapnel and
blast injuries [25].
Further reassurance may be derived from analysis of
incidents where secondary devices to target rescuers
have been reported. The discovery of four unexploded
devices during the aftermath of the Madrid train bomb-
ings of 2004 required repeated evacuation of the incident
site and rapid evacuation of casualties and has been cited
as an attempt to target the emergency response [6]. How-
ever, the KAMEDO analysis of the Madrid bombings
reports that the four unexploded devices had mobile
phone timer triggers identical to the 10 devices that did
explode but that the trigger mechanism appears to have
been set exactly 12 hours out of synchronization [29]. It
may be that the four unexploded devices had been acci-
dentally allocated a different detonation time rather than
an intentionally delayed detonation to target responders.
Similarly, the KAMEDO report of the Bali bombing of
2002 challenges popular belief of a planned delay between
the suicide vest explosion in a packed tourist bar and a
minivan explosion on the street outside. It was speculated
that this delay was intended to maximize casualties among
fleeing revelers and arriving responders [30]. However,
KAMEDO reports that the interval between the explo-
sions may have been seconds rather than minutes as
originally suspected [31]. These facts do not diminish the
catastrophic loss of life in these events but may help coun-
ter fears that terrorists are routinely targeting civilian
emergency responders.
Small arms fire
Rifles and handguns have been widely used as tools of
terrorism across the world and may be used alone or in
conjunction with explosive devices [2,32]. In the US,
around 30,000 people are killed each year by guns, and
such numbers dwarf fatalities due to biological and other
feared but rare modes of terrorism. Deaths due to small
arms fire in the US are largely secondary to criminal
rather than terrorist activity and present a significant
threat to civilian emergency medical responders undertak-
ing their duties in this country [33]. However, in regard to
terrorist incidents specifically, there are few accounts of
injuries to civilian responders from small arms fire in the
medical literature. The majority of reports and analysis are
derived from the Israel-Palestine conflict [27,34].
The perceived threat of small arms incidents dramatic-
ally increased following the 2008 attacks in Mumbai,
where terrorists used multiple strategies of attack (inclu-
ding automatic weapons), roamed across the city, and
remained active for several days. Although the 172 killed
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personnel, civilians and security forces were killed. This
generated worldwide media attention and international
fear of repeated ‘Mumbai-style’ attacks [35].
The horrific massacre of at least 348 people, including
171 children, at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia (Russia),
in 2005 included the murder of two paramedics by
small arms fire. During negotiations with the terrorists,
an agreement was made that Ministry of Emergency
Situations medical personnel in two ambulances could
safely remove the bodies of 20 murdered hostages
from the school grounds. As the paramedics approached
the school, the hostage-takers opened fire, killing two
rescuers [36].
Although no emergency responders were injured in
the 2011 shootings on Utoya island in Norway, the
emergency responders were under direct threat during
the events. During the establishment of the major inci-
dent infrastructure, the initial casualty clearing station
came under direct rifle fire from the terrorist. In the
same incident, when the victims were being medically
assessed in what remained an unsafe environment, med-
ical personnel were not equipped in the same way as other
emergency response teams at the scene with appropriate
personal protective equipment (PPE) [32].
Chemical hazards
Despite the Chemical Weapons Convention, which came
into force in 1997 and which forbids the possession,
development, and use of chemical weapons, chemical
terrorism remains a threat. Countries that possessed
chemical weapons undertook to destroy them, but
several states, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Israel and
its neighboring countries, did not accede to the conven-
tion [37]. Even without state support, non-governmental
groups or even individuals can successfully manufacture
chemical weapons and may remain undetected by gov-
ernment intelligence agencies. Some chemical agents are
used in a controlled environment in industry or agricul-
ture and do not require illicit manufacture. Consequently
concerns have been expressed regarding the accessi-
bility of agents such as organophosphates and the
vulnerability to attack or theft of chemical establish-
ments [38,39].
In conflict and peacetime, there have been numerous
chemical incidents with large numbers of casualties.
There have been multiple attempts by terrorists to har-
ness the lethal effect of such agents, but despite gene-
rating widespread fear, these attempts have met with
limited success to date [37]. Secondary contamination of
medical personnel treating contaminated victims is seen
to occur in accidental incidents, and one study identified
17 medical personnel injured in this way over a 3-year
period in the US [40].The 1994 sarin nerve agent attacks by the Aum Shinri-
kyo cult in Matsumoto and Tokyo, Japan, claimed the
lives of 19 people and injured over 6,000 [41-55]. Health-
care workers suffered secondary contamination in both
incidents; 18 were affected in Matsumoto [46] and 245 in
Tokyo [44,46,48,51]. Identification of the chemical agent
was delayed, and contaminated patients were treated on
the scene and in the hospital by staff without appropriate
PPE. Consequently, secondary contamination of medical
staff occurred; in one report, 13 of 15 doctors involved in
resuscitating a patient became symptomatic, 6 of whom
required atropine [47]. Follow-up of victims after this
sarin attack demonstrated chronic decline of psycho-
motor and memory function at 7 years [43] and high
levels of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at
10 years [56]. The lessons learned from these incidents
have informed chemical terrorism preparedness across the
world [57].
Biological hazards
Biological warfare (but not research into defense or
protection against biological agents) was outlawed by
the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972. Biological
weapons are biological toxins or infectious agents such
as bacteria, viruses, fungi, or parasites intended to kill or
incapacitate and have been widely used throughout his-
tory [37,58]. With the exception of some rapidly acting
toxins, biological agents usually present only hours or
days after exposure with non-specific ‘flu-like’ symptoms
before organ-specific diseases become apparent [58].
The risk presented by biological agents can be classified
by their individual pathogenicity, infectivity, latency,
lethality, transmissibility, and virulence. The US Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention categorize agents
depending on the threat that they may pose to national
security because of their dissemination, person-to-
person transmission, high mortality rates, potential for
social disruption, and need for public health prepared-
ness. The Category A (highest priority) organisms are
rarely seen in the US and include anthrax, botulism,
plague, smallpox, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fever
[59]. Category B agents are more commonly encoun-
tered and include food-and-water safety threats such as
Salmonella species, Escherichia coli 0157:H7, and Vibrio
cholerae. Ricin is the Category B agent most frequently
encountered in the US, can be easily prepared from
castor beans, and has been used in ‘white powder’ let-
ters. Although such acts have been largely criminal in
nature rather than true bioterrorism and are frequently
hoaxes, such incidents pose a potential threat to emer-
gency medical responders [60]. Successful terrorist use
of biological weapons is extremely rare, and one source
suggests that only two confirmed terrorist biological
attacks have harmed humans [61].
Thompson et al. Critical Care 2014, 18:521 Page 5 of 10
http://ccforum.com/content/18/5/521Between October and December 2001, widespread fear
was caused across the US by a series of letters containing
anthrax spores that were sent to government buildings.
Five people died from anthrax, 13 contracted disease, and
many thousands were exposed and took preventative anti-
biotics. Health-care personnel were not specifically tar-
geted, although other emergency services required to deal
with suspicious packages were exposed to risk [62].
The difficulty in identifying biological attacks is appar-
ent from the Salmonella typhi outbreak in The Dalles,
Oregon, in 1984 when 751 citizens were affected [63].
Only 1 year later did it emerge that the Rajneeshee cult
had intentionally contaminated water and salad bars in
an attempt to influence a local election result. Similarly,
when the Aum Shinrikyo cult was investigated in the
wake of the 1995 Tokyo sarin subway attacks, it was dis-
covered that they had built three laboratories to culture
Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, and Coxiella burnetti
and carried out nine undetected biological weapon attacks
between 1990 and 1993 [58,64].
Secondary biological threat has been identified as a
consequence of exposure to contaminated biological
material in explosive incidents. Following the London
bombings of 7 July 2005, bone fragments from other vic-
tims were found embedded as biological foreign bodies
within the soft tissues of five patients at one receiving
hospital [65]. Similar events have occurred in suicide
bombings in Israel and in conflict zones against US mili-
tary personnel, and protocols have been established for
post-exposure interventions to prevent infection with
hepatitis B and C, HIV, or tetanus [66-68].
Radiation
Nuclear detonation by terrorists is perceived to be un-
likely given the state-sponsored level of technology
required to develop or deploy a device [37]. A ‘dirty
bomb’ or radiological dispersal device (RDD) is a more
likely scenario [69]. Radiation sources are routinely used
in science, industry, and medicine and could be used by
terrorists to create an RDD. Concerns have been com-
pounded by the low level of security surrounding these
sources, and there is documented evidence of multiple
missing sources [70-72].
A very small amount of radioactive energy can cause
serious biological damage. External radiation is primarily
gamma radiation that has no mass, travels long distances
in air, and penetrates shielding. Alpha and beta particles
represent the dominant risk if a radioactive substance
has entered the body. Alpha particles consist of two
neutrons and two protons, and although they can travel
up to 3 cm in air, they cannot penetrate skin but are ex-
tremely dangerous if ingested or inhaled. Beta particles
are electrons that can penetrate approximately 5 mm in
skin and 3 cm in air [73].In recent decades, there have been multiple radiation
accidents, including incidents at nuclear power stations
and the accidental misuse of scientific radiation sources
[37,74]. The single non-accidental incident using radi-
ation identified in the medical literature is an assassin-
ation that occurred in London in 2006, when Alexander
Litvinyenko was poisoned with polonium-210. The sin-
gle victim is alleged to have unknowingly ingested an
alpha source and died 22 days later suffering from multi-
organ failure as a result of radiation. Despite the limited
size of this polonium-210 source, the potential scale of
the radiation contamination was illustrated by the 664
individuals from 52 countries who were considered at
risk of exposure following this single incident [75].
Secondary threats for emergency responders
Environmental hazards
Although chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosive (CBRNE) hazards are correctly emphasized
when terrorist incidents are discussed, the more conven-
tional scene hazards of working in an unstable environ-
ment may be associated with greater risk [76]. The list of
potential sources of danger at an incident is lengthy. How-
ever, one generic approach to risk identification is that of
identifying and mitigating the threat of unstable energy
sources, most commonly in the form of kinetic, potential,
electrical, or thermal energy [11]. This theoretical exercise
can identify the key hazards of many high-risk environ-
ments but may be of limited practical assistance when
confronted by a mass casualty terrorist incident.
If the medical literature is assessed to determine the
main environmental threats at terrorist incidents, the
majority of the relevant publications assess the aftermath
of the 9/11 attacks, where extraordinary resources were
required both in the initial phase of the response and in
the prolonged process of rescue and recovery. Unprece-
dented numbers of rescuers worked at the site, and their
experience has created an unparalleled resource docu-
menting the medical sequelae of responding to such an
incident. Between 14 and 21 November 2001, a medical
center was established at the scene of the World Trade
Center (WTC) attacks and treated 9,349 rescue and
recovery personnel working on the site. The most com-
mon presentations were traumatic injuries (29%), res-
piratory problems (22%), and eye complaints (12%). The
medical literature published following the 9/11 attacks
and other international terrorist incidents has illustra-
ted several principal immediate hazards and long-term
consequences.
Airborne particles
Explosions, fire, and building collapses as a consequence
of terrorist activity create dust clouds containing particu-
late matter that may have an immediate and a delayed
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been most extensively studied following the 9/11 attacks
[77]. Although no air-sampling monitors were operating
close to the WTC on the day of this attack, analysis of
fallen dust samples was performed 5 and 6 days afterward.
This demonstrated contamination (1% to 4% by weight)
with particles small enough to be respirable in rescue
workers without protective masks [78]. Early symptoms
reported included eye, skin, respiratory, and nose and
throat complaints [79].
Extensive longitudinal study of WTC workers has been
undertaken and has demonstrated that this cohort has
an increased incidence of asthma, sinusitis, chemosen-
sory loss, sarcoidosis, and gastroesophageal reflux dis-
ease [80-83]. Additionally, suspected carcinogens in the
dust cloud have been proposed as the cause of excess
risk for prostate cancer, thyroid cancer, and myeloma in
WTC rescue workers when compared with that for New
York State residents [84]. Appropriate respiratory pro-
tection reduces the risk of the respiratory and systemic
manifestations of airborne pollutants [85]. In emergency
responders to the 9/11 attacks, longer delays in the
initial use of masks or respirators were associated with
an increased risk of asthma, as was earlier arrival and
longer duration of exposure [86].
Structural instability
Building collapse has been proposed as the most import-
ant risk factor for fatality in building bombings [87], and
residents and responders are at risk following an inci-
dent. When the twin towers of the WTC collapsed, over
400 emergency responders lost their lives [88]. Proposals
for reducing fatalities in a building bombing include eva-
cuation planning exercises for vulnerable buildings and
regular evacuation training of personnel [87,89]. Appro-
priate PPE, including eye protection, can reduce the risk
of injury due to falling objects and flying glass [90,91].
Fire
Fires at terrorist incidents may continue to burn for
many weeks and pose an ongoing threat of both direct
thermal injury and inhaled toxic agents, such as carbon
monoxide and hydrogen cyanide [9,92-94]. Close commu-
nication with fire services and the avoidance of exposure
unless wearing appropriate PPE are central to minimizing
risk [11,92].
Mental health
Many studies have identified psychopathology among
emergency responders to terrorist incidents [95-103].
Although the prevalence of PTSD varies greatly between
studies and incidents, one of the largest cohorts studied
consists of the 28,962 rescue workers who worked at
the WTC site. The overall prevalence of PTSD amongrescue/recovery workers was 12.4%, but the risk was
increased in those who arrived earlier, who worked
for longer, and who were asked to undertake roles that
were not within their usual professional remit [104]. A
longitudinal study of a similar cohort of WTC rescue and
recovery workers demonstrated a cumulative incidence of
depression of 27.5%, PTSD in 31.9%, and panic disorder in
21.2% [82].
Protective factors that may reduce the risk of develop-
ing psychiatric illness following exposure to a terrorist
incident include good pre-event mental health, disaster
preparedness training, and shift rotations that limit
the duration of an individual’s exposure to the scene
[102,104]. Moreover, exhaustion and sleep deprivation
have been demonstrated to impair threat detection
and may compound the risk of exposure to other scene
hazards [105]. Psychiatric services have recently been
proposed to have an important role in disaster response
planning [106], and critical incident stress debriefing has
been reported to mitigate the impact of an event [107].
However, even if staff members are aware that such ser-
vices exist, they are often reluctant to seek help [102,103].
Once psychiatric illness has developed, cognitive behav-
ioral and virtual reality therapies have both been demon-
strated to reduce symptom scores in PTSD following
terrorist incidents [108,109].
Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic
review of the medical literature that aims to identify the
hazards that emergency responders have been exposed
to at international terrorist incidents. The threat of
CBRNE hazards exists at terrorist and non-terrorist inci-
dents, and the risks must be actively mitigated. However,
direct injury to emergency responders from such hazards
is extremely rare and is dwarfed by the more conventional
scene hazards that professionals encounter when res-
ponding to both terrorist and non-terrorist incidents
[7,11,33,110].
This strategy of systematically seeking evidence-based
information from the published medical literature is a
conventional medical and scientific methodology [111].
Additionally, this approach creates clear boundaries in
source materials when addressing such a security-
sensitive issue as terrorism. However, on this subject,
the approach and the available medical literature do
have limitations. Despite the number of publications,
the medical literature does not present a comprehensive
account of international terrorist incidents or their med-
ical sequelae. Medical publications do not reflect the daily
terrorist attacks across the globe but rather cluster around
high-profile events that occur in countries with a cul-
ture of medical publication [12,13]. Organizations that
are dedicated to producing high-quality analysis and
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capacity to report only a handful of the thousands of inci-
dents that occur each year [37]. Even accurately establish-
ing the denominator of total terrorist incidents remains
challenging in the open-source literature, with varying
global estimates and methodological difficulties in verify-
ing data even in individual developed countries [112]. One
source of worldwide data on terrorist incidents identified
19,828 incidents with 86,568 injured casualties and 25,408
fatalities between 1968 and 2004 [113], and only a small
fraction of these incidents generated medical publications.
Medical publications that do arise from terrorist incidents
are of variable format and quality. Little standardization
exists in the published incident reports, and few explicitly
address issues such as scene safety, which may be of
critical importance to future planning and safety.
Critical information regarding scene hazards is frequently
encountered in the text of reports of the medical response
to terrorist incidents but is usually incidental to the princi-
pal subject of the article. Closer examination of the inclu-
ded studies indicated inconsistent indexing of articles on
risks to EMS responders at terrorist incidents on PubMed.
Increasingly consistent reporting of studies related to
EMS personnel safety may reduce these limitations.
The limited publication focus on the early medical re-
sponse is reflected in the fact that 40% of disaster-related
publications address the subject of mental health com-
pared with only 4% on the subject of emergency response
[13]. This may indicate the difficulties in data collection
from chaotic scenes as opposed to the relative ease of
psychological assessment in the long recovery phase.
Despite these limitations, the medical literature repre-
sents a large and extremely valuable source of information
from hundreds of incidents that together should inform fu-
ture practice. Other studies have similarly used a system-
atic approach to local and international incidents and
derived high-quality evidence and identified recurrent sys-
tematic problems that may improve the quality and safety
of future response [19,20,23,114]. The results of this study
may be used to further inform the provision of training
and PPE for emergency services personnel who may be ex-
pected to respond in the early stages of terrorist incidents.
If the medical response to terrorist incidents is to be
based on evidence rather than anecdote, then further
analysis of the literature and future incidents should be
undertaken. However, to achieve this, there is a critical
need to improve international data collection. Several
groups have published standardized medical reporting
templates for major incidents but, despite their quality as
research tools, they are not being routinely used [115,116].
If the focus is to be on learning from the growing inter-
national burden of terrorist incidents across the world,
then a medical reporting mechanism that does not have
the high barrier that conventional medical publicationpresents needs to be established. A template for reporting
pre-hospital major incident medical management has re-
cently been developed following a consensus process of
European major incident experts [117]. This template has
been incorporated into an open-access website [118],
allowing reporting of critical information that may help
save the lives of victims and responders in future terrorist
incidents.
Conclusions
Current major incident training emphasizes the im-
portance of personal safety but is unable to provide an
evidence-based analysis of the scene hazards encountered
at terrorist incidents. There is a need to refine safety guid-
ance for emergency medical responders in light of the ex-
perience from the thousands of international incidents
that occur each year. The medical literature represents an
incomplete and inconsistent record of the global burden
of terrorist incidents but reports a diverse range of threats
at previous incidents. Interestingly, while the direct terror-
ist threats of CBRNE constitute the principal focus of
major incident training and the predominant fears of
responders, the conventional scene hazards of building
collapse, airborne particles, and mental health sequelae
continue to cause greater harm to emergency responders.
If the medical response to terrorist incidents is to be based
on evidence rather than anecdote, analysis of the current
literature should be incorporated into major incident
training. Of critical importance is the need to improve
data collection from major incidents so that the emer-
gency response can develop an evidence-based approach
to saving the lives of victims and responders in the future.
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